Initial Dispositions
Wellington lined his troops, around 72,000 men in all, along the Mont Saint Jean ridge, straddling the Quatre Bras-Brussels road. He had earmarked the position on several previous visits to the area as being good for a defensive stand. There was a reverse slope behind which to shelter the bulk of his army from artillery fire and it was an ideal position for infantry to open out in line and deliver maximum fire on an attacking force. These were tactics which Wellington had repeatedly used to great effect during the Peninsular War. The position was backed by the Forest of Soignes, through which Wellington assured his generals he could retreat intact if necessary. His main concern was for his right flank, which seemed to be somewhat up in the air. He suspected that Napoleon might swing round and roll up the Allied line from this direction. For this reason, Wellington positioned some 18,000 to the west at Halle and Tubize. These troops took no part in the battle but provided peace of mind for the Duke. Another concern was the unreliability of the Dutch-Belgian troops under his command. This had been highlighted at Quatre Bras when many of these troops offered no resistance. Of his 50,000 infantrymen at Waterloo, only 17,000 were British and 13,000 were Hanoverian. The rest were Dutch-Belgian and could not be relied on. Hence, throughout his line, British units were interspersed so as to provide no opportunity for Napoleon to exploit weak sections. Ahead of the line, Wellington positioned troops in the various farm complexes which ran along the front. Occupation of these would prevent the French gunners from moving far enough forward to pound the Allied line at close quarters. As the battle developed, the most important of these garrisons proved to be at Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte.
Napoleon's force on the day, around 69,000 men altogether, lined up with the first and second corps of D'Erlon and Reille on either side of the Brussels road. They were supported by the cavalry of Kellerman and Milhaud, with the formidable Imperial Guard in reserve. Napoleon seems to have dismissed Soult's suggestion that he should roll up the Allied line, opting instead for an artillery bombardment followed by a cavalry assault and finally the all-out infantry advance. His confidence was fuelled by his misplaced assumption that Grouchy would prevent the Prussians coming to Wellington's assistance. Interestingly, Blucher's promise to send troops was the only reason Wellington was willing to fight at all.